WILSON v. GLOSSOP.
able estoppel. And see Reel v. Elder,
62 Penn. St. 317 (1869). But "connivance" generally requires some corrupt intent on the part of the husband
that the wife shall commit the crime,
and not merely making preparations
to detect her in an anticipated or

susl ected infidelity: Robbins v. Robbins, 140 Mass. 528 (1886),distinguishing Mllorrison v. Morrion, 136 Mass.
310 (1884), which -is rather a close
ease upon the facts.
EDMUND I. BENNETT.
Boston.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Suprene Cort of Pennsylvania.
LYNN v. FREEMANSBURG BUILDING AND LOAN ASS'N.
Building associations incorporated under the Pennsylvania Act of 1859,
and having no special power to impose fines, can do so only in the exercise of
their general right to enact suitable by-laws for their government. The validity of such a by-law depends upon the reasonableness of the fines thereby
imposed.
A by-law providing that every stockholder neglecting to pay his monthly
dues and interest," shall forfeit and pay the additional sum of ten cents
monthly on each and every dollar due by him," is oppressive, extortionate,
and unreasonable, and therefore invalid.
Tle sixth section of the Pennsylvania Act of April 10, 1879 (P. L. 17),
providing that the fines or penalties imposed by building associations for nonpaymentof dues, interest, etc., "shall not exceed two per cent. per month on
all arrearages," does not apply to associations incorporated prior to the passage of that act, who have not accepted the provisions thereof.
A stockholder in a building association gave it a mortgage to secure certain
loans to him, for which his stock was also deposited as collateral. Being
threatened with forfeiture of his stock under the by-laws, he subsequently
paid the association a sum necessary to pay all his dues, interest, and fines;
this money was applied in part to the payment of the fines claimed to be due
under the by-laws. Subsequently the stockholder again became in default.
The association forfeited his stock, and proceeded by srire facias on the mortgage. Ifeld, that the stockholder was not estopped by his payment of the
illegal lines from demanding that the sum paid by him, and applied to these
fines, should be credited on the amount due on his mortgage.

to Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County.
Scire facia stur mortgage by the Freemansburg Building and
Loan Assoeihition against Josephus Lynn.
ERROR

By agreement of the parties, the case was heard without a
jury by SCHUYLER, P. J., who found the following facts:
"The Freemansburg Building and Loan Association, plaintiff,
was duly incorporated on November 20, 1872, under Act of
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April 12, 1859 (P. L. 5441). In October, 1874, the defendant
became a member of the Association by subscribing for five
shares of its capital stock, second series, and in October, 1876.,
he subscribed for twenty additional shares in the third series,
but he subsequently withdrew six of these last-mentioned shares,
which left him the owner of nineteen shares.
"The by-laws of the association provide, inter alia, as follows: Each stockholder, for each share held by him, must pay
into the treasury at each stated monthly meeting, the sum of
one dollar, which are called his monthly dues, until the value
of the whole stock shall be sufficient to divide to each share of
stock the sum of $200. The holder of each share of stock is
entitled to a loan from the association of $200. These loans
must be made in open meeting to the highest bidder, but no
loan can be accepted at less than ten per cent. premium. When
a loan is effected, the borrower receives the amount of loan bid,
less the premium, but he must give his obligation for the full
amount, and must pay interest on the same, monthly. To
secure the repayment of the loan, with interest, the borrower
is required to give a satisfactory bond and mortgage, and, in
addition, for every loan of $200, he must transfer one
share of stock to the association, as collateral security.
Article 7, § 1, of the by-laws of the association, provides
as follows: 'Each and every stockholder or trustee who
shall neglect or refuse to pay his monthly dues or interest
as often as the same shall become due and payable, shall
forfeit and pay the additional sum of ten cents, monthly,
on each and every dollar due him.' Article 5, § 5, of the
by-laws, provides as follows: ' Each stockholder or trustee,
on receiving his certificate of stock, shall be considered as obligating himself to pay principally his mouthy dues, fines, and
interests, and in all respects to comply with the requisitions of
the constitution and by-laws, and the rules and regulations of'
the board of directors.' Article 8 of the by-laws provides as
follows: 'I f any stockholder or trustee shall continue to neglect
or refuse to pay his, her, or their monthly dues and fines for
the space of six months, his, her, or their share or shares of
stock may be declared forfeited by the board of directors, when
the same shall revert to the association. After first deducting
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the proportion of losses and expenses, and all fines, the defaulting' stockholder shall be entitled to receive any balance of his,
her, or their monthly payments, and shall from thenceforth
cease to he a member of this association.' Article 9, § 2, of the
by-laws, provides as follows: 'Any stockholder who has received a loan, may repay the same at any time, and, in case of
the repayment thereof before the expiration of the eighth year
after the organization of the corl)oration, there shall Ile refunded
to such stockholder one-eighth of the preniuis paid for every
year of the said eight years then unexpired.'
The defendant, as the owner of nineteen shares of stock,
being entitled to borrow from the association $3,800, at different times bid out smaller sums aggregating that amount, at an
average premium of 22 9-10 per centum, to secure the payment
of which, with interest, he assigned his stock as collateral, and
also gave the mortgage in suit, which is dated December 28,
1876. The mortgage calls Bor the payment of $5,000, but the
correct sum is $3,800. After givilg the mortgage the defendant frequently defaulted in the payment of both his monthly
du-es and interest, in consequence of which he was charged with
a fine of ten cents monthly, on each dollar of his indebtedness
at the time the fines were imposed. To illustrate : D,fendant's
monthly dues and intercst amounted to $38. In February,
1879, he defaulted. By adding the ten per cent. we have his
Ile defaulted again
total indebtedness for that month, $41.80.
the next month, making his total indebtedness, including the
fine for February, $79.80. To get at the amount of his fines
arch, ten per cent. on the $79.80 was calculated, and so on
for
to the end of the chapter. An account of these fines was kept,
not only on the books of the association, but also in a b(,ok
furnished to the defendant for his information.
"The defendant, from time to time, made payments on account of his dues, interest, and fine-, but notwithstanding these
payments he was on Mray 22, 1882, indebted to the association,
as shown by the books, in the following sum : Dues, $302;
interest, $302; fines, $360.1,-total, 8964.13. In addition to
these sums the defendant was then indebted on protested checks
given for fines and dues, for which lie had received credit, in a
sum sufficient to increase his indebtedness for fines, dues and
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interest to consideraby more than $1,000. On the said twentvsecond day of 'May the defendant, under the threat that his
mortgage would be foreclosed, paid $1,000. A few days afterwards he paid in addition a sum sufficient to cancel his entire
indebtedness to the association for fines, dues, anl intirest.
These payments were made by the defendant volntarily, Aith
a full knowledge of the facts, and for the purpose of squaring
his accounts with the association, and they were so appli.].
After thus squaring his accounts tle (lefendant continued to he
a member of the association, sometimes paying his (ues and
interest, and sometimes defaultintr as before, until February 14,
1885, when his stock was declared forfeited at a meeting of the

board of directors, the defendant having neglected to pay his
monthly dues and fines for the space of six months prior to the
date last mentioned.
"Between May 22, 1882, and February 14, 1885, the defendant became indebted to the association for dues, interest,
and fines in the following sums : Dues, $627; interest, $627;
fines, $1,536.38,-total, $2,800.38. During the same period he
made payments, as appears from the books of the association,
as follows: Dues, $335 ; interest, S335 ; fines, $442.59,-total,
$1,112.59. Included in this last sum are a number of checks
aggregating $202.18, which the plaintiff alleges were not paid,
but the evidence as to these checks is not sufficientlv clear to
permit of their adjustment in the present suit. Since suit
brought the defendant has paid to the association $175.37,
which the association has never appropriated, although still
holding the money. Defendant now asks to have this money
appropriated to the payment of the mortgage. The defendant
has received from the association, as the net proceeds of his
mortgage, $2,946, and $150 wlhen he withdrew his six sharcs;
total, $3,096. He has paid to the association the following
sums : Dues, $1,878; interest, 81,551.50; fines, $950.31 ; since
suit brought, $175.37,-total, $4,555.18."
The court calculated the amount due on the mortgage, as
follows: "Charge the defendant with $2,257, which is tile
difference between $3,800, the original amount of the mortgage,
and $1,543, which is the amount of dues and interest paid by
the defendant up to and including the settlement of May 22,
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1882. Also with dues and interest, at the rate of $38 per
month, friom May 22, 1882, up to February 14, 1885, when
defendant's stock was forfeited, less $670 paid on account of
dues anld interest during this period. Also with interest on
$2,257 from February 14, 1885, to this (late, crediting'the following payments: May 9, 1885, $49.25; June 24, 1885,
$41.53; July 27, 1885, $45.13; August 26, 1885, $39.46.
The balance will be the amount for which judgment should be
entered against the defendant." Whereupon defendant took
this writ.
Ed'(ard J-Fox and .Ed'ardJ.-Fox,Jr., for plaintiff in error.
0. I. Meyers and B. F. Fackenthall, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GREEN, J.-We are clearly of opinion that the literal meaning of the by-laws of this plaintiff, which imposes fines upon
members for ion-payment of dues or interest, is that the fine of
10 per cent. is imposed upon the aggregate amount of all money
due at the end of each month, no matter for what cause. This
would include fines previously imposed, as well as the amount
previously owing for dues and interest. The question then arises
whether such a by-law is a valid exercise of the legislating power
of the association. It is not claimed that the general law of 1859,
under which the plaintiff was incorporated, confers any special
power to impose fines, and hence we assume that the right to
enact the by-law in question is merely the general right which
all corporations possess of enacting suitable by-laws for their
government. The provision of the sixth section of the Act of
1859 that no premiums, fines, or interest on such premiums that
may accrue according to the provisions of the act shall be deemed
usurious, must be held, so far as fines are concerned, to be limited
to such fines as are imposed under by-laws which are lawful.
Is, then, the by-law in question a valid by-law? That depends upon a consideration of its meaning and effect. We have
stated the meaning of this by-law to be that the fine is imposed
each month upon the whole amount due at the end of each
month, no matter for what cause. The words are: "Each and
every stockholder or trustee who shall neglect or refuse to pay
his monthly dues or interest as often as the same shall become
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due and payable shall forfeit mid pa- the additional sum of ten
cents monthly on each and every dollar due by him." It is
clear the tell cents penalty or forfeiture is to be paid monthly.
This being so, it is to be repeated every month during which
tile amount due remains unpaid. The effect of this would be
that at the end of Deceniber in any year the member was indebted $50 to the association, ard remained so throughout the
year following, he would then owe as a fine twelve times the
original penalty on that one default; in other words, 120 per
cent. upon the principal sum for which default was made. In
addition to this, he would also owe the full interest he might be
paying on the amount expressed in his obligation, no matter how
usurious that interest might be. Still further, as the balance is
to be struck at the end of each month, the member would owe
at that time all that he owed at the end of the preceding month,
and, in addition thereto, the interest and penalty, for the current
month, besides the dues, and the account would be made up by
charging him with 10 per cent. upon the principal, the interest,
and the fine due at the end of the preceding month, and adding
them to the dues and interest for the current month. If another default was then made, the same process would be repeated
at the end of each succeeding month during the continuance of
the defiuilts. It is needless to enter into a detailed computation
to show what the aggregate result of such a process would be in
any given case. That it is unreasonable, extortionate, and
oppressive to the last degree must be at once conceded. If the
monthly penalty were 100 per cent. instead of 10 it would only
be a difference in degree, not in character. Of course, if there
is an unlimited right to impose, by means of a by-law, any
amount of fine or penalty which the association may please to
ordain, and the law is powerless to interfere, the results must
be accepted, no matter how unjust or oppressive they may be.
But we do not so understand the law upon this subject. The
fines in this case were imposed by means of a corporate by-law.
While it may be conceded that as between a corporation and
one of its members a somewhat different rule would prevail
from that which would be applicable as between the corporation
and strangers, yet there is a limit of authority, even when corporators only are affected.
VOL.XXXVI.-47
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We have not been ref'erred to any case in which an unlimited
authority to impose fines by a building association .ias been declared by any court. A number of decisions adverse to such a
right have been made by courts of last resort, though none l)y

this court, the direet questionl having, apparently, never been
before us. The egisl-laturc of Pennsylvania by the sixth section
of the Act of April 10, 1879 (P. L. 17), enacted that "fines or
penalties for the non-payuent of installments of dues, interest,
bonus, or premiums shall not exceed two per centum per month
on all arrearages."
If this plaintiff were subject to this law, the

que.ztion would be settled at once, and all of the fines in excess
of 2 per cent. per month would be undoubtedly illegal. But the
plaintiff was chartered under the Act of 1859, and it is admitted,
or at least found by the court below, and the findings not
challenged, that it has never accepted the provisions of the Act
of 1879, and therefore is not subject to it. We do not, however, see that this circumstance is very material, because there is
no previous statutory authority to exact any specified fine, and
the open question we are considering is, what is the law in the
absence of such authority? It is very clear now, and since 1879,
that the policy of the law in this commonwealth is that building
associations shall not exact oppressive and extortionate fines
from their defaulting members, and we feel amply justified in
decidi(ng, as we now do, that a fair inference flows from this legislation that fines in excess of 2 per cent. per month are oppressive and unreasonable, by policy of law. That policy is put in
the fiom of explicit statutory mandate as to all associations
which are sulect to the operations of the Act of 1879, whether
by subsequent incorporation, or by previous incorporation and
subsequent acceptance.
As to the time anterior to the statute, we feel no hesitancy in
saying that a monthly penalty of 10 per cent., repeated by
arithmetical progression with each succeeding default, was
clearly oppressive, extortionate, and unreasonable, by policy of
law, and by the teachings of the enlightened conscience of man.
The effect of such a taint upon a by-law is to render it void,
and hence we are not called upon to fix upon any rate of fine
which would have been reasonable, and hold the by-law good
for that rate, and void only as to the excess. The taint is fatal
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to its validity, and it is therefore without any force. The plrpose of the fine is merely to enforce the payment of the dues
and interest, and, as this is only all obligation for the payment
of money, the extortionate character of the penalty becomes
the more conspicuous in proportion to the amount hv which it
exceeds the ordinary rate allowed by law, and hy general consent, for the use of money. No sound reason can be advanced
for the necesity of exacting so gross a penalty for a mere oission to pay a debt.
The question has been before other courts than ours, and has
been adjudged in accordance with the principles stated. Tius,
in Ohio, the legislature of the State expressly authorized building and loan associations to levy and collect from their members
"such sums of money, by rate of stated dues, fines, * * *
as the corporation by its laws may adopt." Here would seem
to be an unlimited authority to the associations to impose any
amount of lines they might see fit; but the Supreme Court of
Ohio said, in a case arising under its provisions: " It is to be
regretted that the legislature was not more specific in making
the grant of power thus intended to be conferred. * * *
That there are limits, however, beyond which the corporation by
its by-laws cannot go, is undoubted. (1) The amount of the
fine must be reasonable; (2) it can be imposed only by way of
punishment for some delinquency in the performance of a duty
which the member may owe to the corporation by reason of his
membership ; (3) it is unreasonable, and therefore we assume
that the legislature did not intend that more than one fine should
be imposed for the same delinquency." .Hqermaav. Buiting
Ass'n, 25 Ohio St. 186 (1874); Bvilding Ass'n v. Gallagher,
Id. 208 (1874).
In Endlich on Building Associations, § 412, the writer says:
"But the courts have been unanimous in discountenancing a
repeated imposition of the same fine increased every time, upon
the principle of arithmetical progression. Thus, where the fine
upon each share's dues in arrear was for the first month 12 cents,
for the second month 37 cents, for the third month 75 cents, and
for the fourth month $1.25, and for every following month 50
cents more than the amounts charged in the preceding one, the
rate was held to be unreasonable and exorbitapt ;" citing Build-
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ing Ass'n v. Gallier, cited by BIRDSE YE, J., in Loan Ass'n v.
Wecbstcr, 25 Barb. 263. 'Mr. Endlich, in § 413 of his excellent
work, says: "The proper measure of fines is the real damage
the building association sustains from the failure of a member
to pay his dues, which damage is really equal to interest upon
the amount, togrether with the proportion coming to it from the
then attainable premiums upon the sale of money. Tile fine
should be slightly in excess of this, so as to make it more profitable to the member to pay promptly than to lag behind.
*
* *
A~ fine of from one to two per cent. per month would
in nearly all cases be sufficient and just,"-citing Loan Ass'n v.
Thomson, 52 Ga. 427 (1874). While we express no binding
opinion upon this subject, as it is not necessarily before us, there
is much good sense in the suggestion, and the amount of the
reasonable fine intimated in such cases seems to accord very closely
with the amount fixed by our own law of 1879.
The argument that only one fine could be imposed, because
the legislature could not be presumed to have intended to authorize more than one, is not applicable in the present case,
because we are construing, not a legislative enactment, which
must be enforced as far as may be, but a by-law of a corporation
which is plainly in violation of the principles we have stated,
and therefore of no effect whatever. In Maryland, the same
ruling appears to have been made, in the cases of Shannon v.
Building Ass'n, 36 Md. 383, and Building Ass'n v. Lewin, 38
Id. 445 (1873). The general rule that by-laws of corporations
must be reasonable, and must not be oppressive, on peril of invalidity, is such familiar doctrine that a citation of authorities in
support of it is unnecessary. In Endlich on Building Associations, at § 271, it is said: "And all by-laws, to be binding, must
be in conformity (1) with existing and supreme laws; * * *
(2) with the charter, its letter and spirit; (3) with reason and
equity." Ang. & A. Corp., § 347. The same rule exists as to
ordinances of municipal governments, as was held in Icneedler v.
Borough of Norristown, 100 Pa. St. 368 (1882).
For the reasons we have stated, we hold that the by-law of
the plaintiff imposing the ten per cent. penalty in question, is
unreasonable and oppressive, and therefore invalid and of no
effect.
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It is argued, however, that the fines, or some of them, were
voluntarily paid lby the defendant, and therefore cannot be
recovered back. This is not an action to recover back the illegal
fines, but a scire faeia.s by the association on the mortgage given
by the defendant, and the question is, for wlht amount shall
judgment be entered ? or, rather, how much is legally due on the
mortgage? There is a clear distinction between a suit to recover
back moneys which have been paid by mistake, either of law or
fact, and interposing as a defense such payments as could not
have been recovered on account of their illegality. In the latter
class of cases the payments, as a rule, are credited on the amount
legally due. This is always done in cases of usurious payments
where the obligation is still outstanding. We can see no difference in principle between that class and the present. While it
may be true that the fines are no part of the mortgage debt, it
is also true that they are moneys paid by defendant to plaintiff
in consequence of a relation of debtor and creditor existing
between them, and, if the creditor has no right to receive then
as fines, they have no right to receive them in any other capacity
than as creditor. Being received by a creditor, it is obvious the
moneys thus paid must be applied to whatever was legally due.
Even if the question depended upon whether the defendants
made the payments distinctively as for fines, the evidence is not
at all clear that such was the fact. A gross sum was paid, of
which the fines were a part, but no specific receipt was given,
and the credits entered on the account were in aggregate sums.
But we think this feature of the case quite immaterial, since the
payments, so far as tie fines are coucerned, were for illegal
demands which the plaintiff could not claim, and having received
them, cannot, either in law or in conscience, retain them. The
question in this proceeding, is only how much is legally due
upon the obligation in suit, and, in determining that question,
credit should be given for all moneys claimed and received as fines.
Judgment reversed, and record remitted, with directions that
the amount due, if any, upon the mortgage in suit, be determined in accordaace with the foregoing opinion.
Generally- Definition.-Fine is a
common instrument by which to compel performance of duties by members

of corporations. associations, and societies. Attendance at corporate aszemblies and acceptance of a corporate
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office are duties each member owes to
the corporation to which he belong-.
and their performance may be required by corporate by law and compelled by tile
imposition ofa lie.
A fine may be delined as "a pectniarv penalty, and is commonly (perhals always) to be collected by a suit
in some form :" Gasselink v. Cnqbell,
4 Iowa, 300 (18-6). Another delinition is "amends or pecuniary nulet
for an oflen~.e committed:" State v.
R]obertson. 1.5Rich. (S. C.) 20 (1867;.
A better definition is that given by
Mr. Endl;ch in his work on Iluilding
Associations (P 379) : "Fines are impositions, in the nature of liquidated
damages, Upi n members neglecting to
pay, at the proper time to the society,
any moneys which are due to the lat-

Pa. St. 180 (1876) ; Link v. German.
town B. Ass'n, 89 Pa.St. 15 (1879).
Requisites.-'fhe requisites of a fine
:are clearly indicated by the Supreme
Court of Ohio, which says: "That
there "re limits, however, beyond
which the corporation by its by-laws
cannot go, i und.ubted.
1. The
amount of the fine most be reasonable.
2. It can be imposed only by way of
luntishment for some delinquency in
the perforumnce of a duty, which
the member may owe to tim corporation by reason of his membership.
3. It is unreasonable, and therefore
we assume that the legislature did not
intend that more titan one fine should
be imposed for thesame delinquency:"
layerirmanv. Ohio, etc., Ass'n, 25 Ohio
St. 202 (1874).
ter from them."
And for various
Ultra vires.-Besides possessing
other definitions of "line," see De these requitites the fine must not be
leystcr v. Micehael, 6 N. Y. 495 (1882); ultra vires-that is, it must not exceed
State v. Ste(n, 14 Tex. 398 (1855);
the amount of money which the
Vllagc of Lancaster v. Richardson, 4 society or company may lawfully levy,
Lans. (N. Y.) 140 (1871); MfcGregor collect, and use..A company's power to
v. Onn..tork, 17 N. Y. 162 (18521;
line does not authorize it to levy a
Ilanscond v. Russell, 11 Gray, 373 tax. The fines levied must not be
(185S); "ein v. USited States, I Wv- such as to produce to the company, if
oming, 217 (1875); Laubernheinme," v. succesbfully levied and collected, a
J[ann, 19 Wis. 520 (186-) ; In reIon, sun greater ttan it needs or may law6 Oregon, 469 (1877); Common Coun- filly acquire for any of its legitimate
cilv. ,irehild, 1 Ind. 315 (1858); U. purposes. This was decided in the
S. v. Siunts, 1 Crane]h, 252 (1803) ;P
London Pipe Co.'s case, wherein a
Briltingham, 1). Ct. S. D. N. Y., Dcby-law was held bad, which provided
cenuber, 1880; 5 Fed. R. 191.
that every freeman, using or not using
Validity.-" The validity and bind- the said art, mystery, or trade, should
ing effect of their fines, generally, de- pay yearly to the company, 8s. to be
pends upon statuto y authority con- paid quarterly, and every journeyman
ferred upon the society for that
of the company, 4s. yearly, to be paid
p irpose, expressly or by implication,
quarterly, and that every person reand upon a by-law or regulation es- fusing, sitould forfeit twice the sum.
ablishing the rate and principles
Lord TExTERDEN- said. "It seems to
which are to govern their assessment:"
us, that as the amount of these conEndlich, Build. Ass'n, 379.
tributions is not confined to what tile
Statutory authority to impose fines is proper demands of the company may
essential, else the company cannot require, but is uniformly the same,
levy them: Jarrelt v. a~pe, 68 Pa. St. let the company's expenditure be lit67 (1871); Huernersown B. Adn, 82
tle or great, and as there is no state-
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ment from which we can collect that
tie rightful expenditure of the company requiires any such contribution,
this, which is in the nature of a tax
upon the compa,,y, cannot be supported:" Loa,lo, Pipe Co. v. Wood7 Barn. & Cress.852 (1823). But,
roffe,
a by-law that every inn-holder, being
a brother of the company, should pay
2s. per quarter, to be applied to particular purposes, for the benefit of the
company, was held good, the purpo-es
for which the money so collected
might be applied, being commensurate with the payments required: Itiholder's Case, 1 Wils. 281 (1750).
lndefaitene.s may invalidate a fine.
Thus, a by-law requiring "any person" to accept a corporate office, on
penalty of fine, is objectionable as
including persons not members of the
corporation and ineligible to its
offices: Mtynr of Oxford v. Wildgwose, 3 Lev. 293; London Pipe Co.
v. Woodroffe, 7 Barn. & Cress. 852
(1828). Ilut the subject-matter and
context of the by-law may show that
it applies only to " persons" who
are members of the corporation, in
which case it will be held good:
.LatonPipe 0O. v. IVoodriffe, 7 Barn.
& Cress. 852 (1823).
l?,soaa.leness.-Theamount of the
fine where not fixed by charter or
statute is discretionary with the society, association, or company, limited, however, by the rule that the
amount of the fine must be reasonable. An exorbitant fine will be relieved against in equity: Mulloy v.
Fifth Mad B. A., 2 McArth. 594
(1876), and see cases infra. For instance, in a build:ng society not more
than one fine can be imposed for the
non-payment of any installment of
principal of a loan: Forest City, etc.,
Ass'a v. Galklgher, 25 Ohio St. 208
(1874); Iiigernan v. Ohw, etc., B.
Assn, 25 Id. 186 (1874). Cumula-
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tive lines are not allowed: j',weamcnwdt 1'crluecant, etc., ,'vc. v. Lewin,
36 'Md. 445 (1873); S.iuion v. Howard .Meat. Bldg. Ass'n, 36 Id. 384
(1872). See also, Oemulyee B. & L.
ASs in v. Thomison, 52 Ga. 428 (1874).
"A- second fine," say the Supreme
Court of Ohio, "for the non-payment
of the same stated due, is a second
punishment for time same oflbnse. It
is not a sullicient answer to the last
proposition to say that the non-payncnt of the same stated due at a subsequent day is a new offense. The
obligation to pay when the due first
matured was complete. No new obligation to pay it in the future is undertaken by the defaulting member,
but the obligation or duty to pay it at
maturity continues after default, until
payment be made:" Jlgteinaa v.
Ohio, etc., Ad'n, 25 Ohio St. 203
(1874).
Rules imposing fines are also always
strictly construed in favor of the member filled. A rule fining threepence
per share for the first month's delinquency and 3d. per share additional
for each succeeding month's delinquency, does not mean 3d., 6d., Vd.
fine per shareand so on in progres-ion,
but simply 3d. per share line, each
month: In re Ti'ierncy, 0 Jr. Eq. Series
1 (1S74).
Where the rules of a society provided for the imposition of lines according to a scale shown in a table
covering a period of six months,
IIdd, that only lines for six months
could be imposed It was not proper
to ascertain the principle underlying
the imposition of lines during the six
months and fine according to that
principle for the whole time of the
delinquency, ev n though it greatly
exceeded six months: Lov oy v. Mulkern, 46 L. J. CI. Div. 630 (1877). A
fine of Is. on the pound in default,
cannot be divided and where the de-
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fault is of a fraction of a pound, no
line can be levied: Three qbwra.3, etc.,
Soc. v. Doyle, 13 C. B. (N. S) 290
(1862). But a fine of 10 cents for a
failin e to pay as dues 25 cents a week
on each share, the par value of which
is $150, isa reasonable line: MeGannon v. Central B. Assoc., 19 W. Va.
726 (1882).
Fines against Borrowers and Depositors. -Borrowers cannot be fined
for non-payment: Parker v. United
States, etc.,Ass'an, 19 W.Va. 744 (1882),
and while fines may be authorized by
law as against membos of a company
or associatiou, they cannot be imposed on depositors: Forest City. etc.,
Ass'n v. Galtgner, 25 Ohio St. 211
(1S74).
Literest is not allowable on fines:
Ingoldby v. Ril.'y, 28 L. T. R. (N. S.)
55 (1873). And fines cannot be imposed for the non-payment of interest:
Forest City, etc., C6. v. Gallagher, 25
Ohio St. 211 (1874); HaTgerman v.
Ohio, etc., B. Ass'n, 25 Ohio St. 186
(1874).
Fines cannot be imposed for the
non-payment of interest because the
relation between the company and the
person owing it interest, is that of
debtor and creditor, not that of company and member, and while the law
may authorize a company to fine persons as its members, for derelictions of
duty as vembers, it does not authorize
it to fine persons who are its debtors,
for derelictions of duty as such, and
not as members. Perhaps, too, it
may be fairly objected that the imposition of a fine for the non-payment
of interest is usurious: H
fyerman v.
Ohio, etc., Assn, 25 Ohio St. 186
(1874).
Security.-'When a fine is valid, as
it may be for, say, the non-payment
of installments on stock: Parker v.
Butcher, 36 L. J. Eq. 552 (1867);
payment of it may be secured by

mortgage: liagerman v. Ohio B., etc.,
As'n, 2. Ohio 6t. 186 (1874) ; and it
must lie paid even, when not mentioned in tei mortgage: Clarkville,etc.,
A.s',v. Stephens, 11 C. E. ur. (N. J.)
351 (1b 75).
F may be bound by.-Even a
wife may be bound by a fine levied
against her husband. A married
woman joining in a mortgage given
to secure tie payment of fines levied
against her husband by a building
association, of which he was a member is bound thereby: Juaniata B.
Asn v. ilfiixeU, 84 Pa. St. 315 (1877).
But as to recovering fines from married women, see also Wolbach v. Lehigh B. Ass'n, 84 Pa. St. 211 (1877);
Miner v. Graham, 12 Harris (Pa)
491 (1855); Glass v. Marwick, 4
Wright (Pa.) 140 (1861); P'atterson
v. .Robenson, 1 Casey (Pa.) 81 (1855);
Black v. Galuxty, 12 Harris (Pa.) 18
(1854'; Tanner's Appeal, 95 Pa. St.
118 (1880); see alqo Massey v. Citizcud Bldg. Ass'n, 22 Kansas, 624
(1879).
Cash payment mu.st be made where
required.-Executiveofficers have no
authority to set aside a by-law of
their company, requiring the cash
payment of fines or dues: Peoples
Bldg. Ass'n v. Wroth, 43 N. J. Law 70
(1831). In this ease. it was customary
for some members of a building association to pay their dues to the secretar) or president, with tie request
that lie would pay the treasurer, to
save the nessity o; attendance at
the monthly times of payment. In
some cases, when these meulbers were
not prepared to pay, the officer assumed tie payment forthem. Again,
the tpayments were sometimes withleld, and the bare promise givenl bv
the officer who acted for these members, was received by the treasurer as
cash and was so entered on the books.
.Hdd,that the treasurer and his sure-
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ties were liable to account for payment so entered, just as if the cash
was in fact received, even though all
the above proceedings were known
and sanictioned by lit the executive
officers of the association.
-Votice of finable delinquency is
essential.-Notice of default in the
payment of dues or fines must be
given, before a company can take
proceedings to enforce payment by
expulsion or otherwise: Wochtd v.
The Noah Widows', etc., Society, 84 X.
Y. 28 (1881). In the absence of any
agreement by the members of a coinpany or association or any provision
in its charter or by-laws for a different mode of service of a notice of
default in paying fines or dues, service should be made personally, as
required at common law, where the
object is to deprive a person of his
rights or property; or if sucl service can be dispensed with, then it
should be made in such other mode
as will be most likely to eflect its
object: Id. Omission to serve notice
of a member's default in paying a
fine or an assessment is not excused
by his change of residence: Id. Especially is notice of default in payment of fines or dues required, where
the member has died and it is sought
to enforce p.aymnent against his executor or administrator or heirs: Id.
Fine, not a penalty relicred against in
equty.-A fine is not a penalty against
which equity will relieve, where it is
not unreasonable: .Mattersonv. Elderfield, L. R. 4 Ch. App. 207 (1869);
Thompson v. Hudson, 2 Ch. App. 255
(1867) ; Parkerv. Butcher, 36 L. J.
Ch. 552.
The sum stipulated to be paid by
a member of a building association,
under by-laws or regulations authorized by its charter, for a default in
settling hi. weekly dues is not a forfeiture non-enforceable in equity, but
VOL. XXXVI.-48
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is simply an amount conventionally
due upon the accruing of the weekly
installment and the failure to pay it
accordingly. It is in the nature of
liquidated damages, agreed to be paid
for the non-performance of a promise or covenant, and where they are
not unconscionable or disproportioned
to the exigency of the case, a court
of equity will award their payment,
more especially when incidentally
involved in a matter confided to its
peculiar jurisdiction and control, e.
g., foreclosure of a mortgage. From
the character of these building associations, the imposition of adequate
fines as agreed upon by the by-laws,
is justified in order to prevent default in the punctual payment of the
weekly dues, upon which, the success
of the company depends ; or in case
of default, that some reasonable
equivalent for the consequent damage
sustained, may be provided: Shannon
v. Howard Meiut. Bldg. Ass'n, 36 Md.
393 (1872).
.Enforcement in equity.-If equity
would not enforce the collection of
reasonable fines, upon foreclosure of
a mortgage to a building association,
the anomaly of sending the company
into a court of law to collect the
fines would be presented. It would
be difficult successfully to manage
such institutions, under such conditions: Shannon v. Howard fut. Bldg.
Fines,
Ass'n, 36 Md. 394 (1872).
therefore, may be included in decree
of foreclosure of mortgage: Hagerman v. Ohio B. & S. As.s'n, 25 Ohio
St. 186 (1874).
A covenant to pay "all fines imposed by the articles of the association," does not make the articles a
partof the mortgage or authorize the
coturt to consider them in construing
it: Bobertson v. Am. hlomesteadAss'n,
10 Md. 397 (1857).
The payment of stated dues and
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fines cannot be resisted by a member
on the ground that the by-laws of the
association have not been adopted by
a vote of the directors, where it appears that they have been recorded,
acted upon, and enforced as the bylaws of the association: Hagermanv

Ohio, etc., Assn, 25 Ohio St. 186
(1874).
Fines must be paid, even when not
mentioned in mortgage: Clarkvill,
etc., Ass'n v. Stephens, 11 0. E. Ur. (N.
J.) 351 (1875).
ADELBERT IhA-MILTON.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
GIVEN v. WISCONSIN ODD FELLOWS' MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO.
A certilicate of insurance, in the nature of a policy on the husband's life
for the benefit of his wife and payable to her after his death, whereshe dies
before he does, is payable to the person entitled thereto under the rules and
by-laws of the company which issued it.

THI. defendant was an incorporated company carrying on the
business of life insurance on the mutual benefit plan, but con-

fined its membership to members in good standing in the Independenit Order of Odd Fellows in Wisconsin, and certain female
relatives of Odd Fellows, and granted insurance for the benefit
of the families of the insured.
The rules and by-laws of the company provided that any
member thereof "may at any time before his or her death,
notify the secretary, in writing, to whom his or her insurance
shall be paid after his or her death, which notice the secretary
shall keep on file in his office, and in all such cases the said
insurance shall be paid directly to the person designated in such
notice." It was further provided therein, that on the death of
the member, "the person designated before death or his widow,
child or children, mother, sister or sisters, father, brother or
brothers, as the case may be, and in the order named, if not
otherwise directed by the deceased previous to death, shall
receive out of the funds of the company

*

*

*

the sum of

$1,000, ninety days after due proof of death." And further,
" if the deceased member leaves no such relatives, nor any direction for the payment of the money, the company shall pay the
expenses of his burial, if there be sufficient funds, and any
surplus shall be paid to the lodge of which deceased was a
member, to be placed in the widow and orphans' fund of such
lodge"
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One Simeon S. Given was a member of the company delendant, and at the time of his death, held a valid certificate of such
rmembership. When the certificate was issued to him he directed
in due form that the insurance be paid to "Saral Given, my
wife." He never changed or recalled such direction. lie became a member of the company in 1881. His wife, Sarah
larch 9, 1885, he married the plaintiff,
Given, died in 1884.
Lizzie Given, and December 20, 1885, died, leaving surviving
him his widow and two children by his wife Sarah. A child
of the last marr:iage was born, March 1, 1886, and survived her
father. The defendant refused to pay the insurance money to
the plaintiff widow, Lizzie Given, and she brought the present
action.
The foregoing facts, and all the other facts essential to show
the liability of the company for the insurance on the life of
Simeon S. Given, were alleged in the complaint, but the cour!
sustained a general demurrer, and from the order in that behalf
the plaintiff appealed.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LYox, J.-The defendant company concedes its liability to
pay the insurance on the life of Simeon S. Given, and that the
complaint sufficiently shows such liability, but claims that the
same is payable to the legal representatives of the deceased
Sarah Given, and not to the plaintiff. Whether it is so payable
is the only question raised by the demurrer to the complaint.
The question was very fully and ably argued by the respective
counsel, and numerous authorities bearing upon it were cited
and discussed by them. We find it unnecessary to consider
those authorities at length, for the question has already been
decided by this court in Foster v. Gile, 50 Wis. 603.
In that case, a policy of insurance had been issued by the
Penn Mutual Insurance Company, of Pennsylvania, on tile life
of one Walter H. Ballon, and by the terms of the policy the insurance money was payable to the two children of the insured,
named therein, in equal shares, and to "their guardians, executors, administrators, or assigns." Both beneficiaries died before
their father. Ballou died without making any change in the
beneficiaries named in the policy. The contest was between the
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administrator of the insured, and the administrator of the beneficiaries. It was held that the administrator ot the beneficiaries
was entitled to the insurance money on the sole ground that the
same was made payable not only to them, but to "tlheir guardians, executors, administrators, or assigns." The rule there laid
down is, that unless the policy points out to whom the insurance
money shall be paid, in case the beneficiary die before the insured, the appointment of the beneficiary is revoled by his
death. It was so held, in analogy to the rules relating to lapsed
legacies. Had the words, " their guardians, executors, administrators, or assigns," or equivalent words, been omitted from the
clause of the policy naming the beneficiaries, the judgment would
have been that the administrator of the insured was entitled to
the money. The question was very carefully and fully considered in that case, and, although there was some difference
of opinion between the members of the court, the judgment
must be taken as a settlement of the question in this State, until
the rule is changed by competent authority.
In the case of Ballou v. Gile, 50 Wis. 614, there were no
words of inheritance or transmission in the appointment of a
beneficiary, and hence the case might as well have been decided
upon the rule of Foster v. Gile. Probably it would have been,
but for the difference in the opinions of the justices in the latter
case. Ballou v. Gile was a case of insurance in a benevolent
company under whose rules the money was payable only to
those dependent upon the insured. If no such persons sur%ived
the insured, the insurance lapsed and the liability of the company therefor ceased. So the judgment in that case went upon
the restricted liability of the insurer, because we could all concur in placing it upon that ground.
Our attention was called by counsel to R. S., § 2347, as
sustaining the contention of the company. It is not probable
that the section was intended to affect an insurance by a purely
benevolent association, upon the life of a member, for the benefit
of those dependent upon him. In such case it would seem that
the beneficiaries appointed by the charter or by-laws of the association would be entitled to the insurance money, even though
the insured member may have attempted to appoint a different
beneficiary. But, however this may be, we do not think the
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statute (were it here applicable) would take this case out of the
rule of Foster v. Gile. Certainly it would not unless it vested
in the original beneficiary, Sarah Given, the absolute right to
the insurance money as her separate property or estate. That
a statute which, in principle, was like § 2347, did not work such
a result, was held by this court in Kernan v. Howard, 23 Wis.
108.
Applying the rule of Foster v. Gile to the present case, the
death of the wife, Sarah Given, during the life of the insured,
abrogated the direction that the insurance money be paid to her,
and left it to be paid to the person entitled thereto under the
rules and by-laws of the company. That person is the widow
of the insured, the plaintiff in this action. It follows that the
complainant states a cause of action in her favor, and hence that
the demurrer thereto should have been overruled.
Rlglits in a policy of insurance in
favor of a marriedwoman, after the death
of her husband.-A variety of causes
have given great impetus to the business of life insurance within a few
years. With many men, it is a favorite mode of providing for those who
are dependent upon them. One consequence of the increased favor with
which it is regarded, is that many
new questions are arising for the consideration of bench and bar. Owing,
in part, to the fact that the business
is conducted by a vast number of corporations and societies, each of which
has features more or less unlike those
of every other, and that the policies
or certificates of each are peculiar to
itself these new questions are varied
in their character. Hence there is
difficulty, attended with danger, in
attempting to state general principles
which are to be taken as applicable
to all jurisdictions and contracts. In
considering some of the late cases
which treat of rights in a policy of
insurance on the husband's life in
favor of his wife, where he survives
her, it is considered more prudent to

state them than to attempt to draw
rules from them.
Olmsted v. Keyes, 85 N. Y. 593, is a

leading case on the subject. A policy
taken by the husband on his life, was
payable to a trustee for the benefit of
his wife. No provision was made in
it for the contingency of her death
previous to his. She died intestate.
The insured remarried and at his.
request, and apparently for value, the
trustee made an assignment of the
policy to the second wife. She survived her husband, as did several
children by the first marriage and one
by the second. The court found that
the insured paid all the premiums
and that his purpose was that his
widow should have the avails of the
policy if she survived him, and if she
did not, that they should go to his
children. It was ruled that the
policy was the property of the first
wife while she lived; that upon her
death intestate the title to it vested
in the husband as survivor, her
trustee becoming his trustee by operation of law; that the assignment
vested the title in the second wife,
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and made her the sole beneficiary.
(Two judges dissented.)
It is well established in New York
that a person who insures his life in
good faith, may, with tile insurers
consent, deal with the policy as lie
could with any other chose in action.
And the court say in the case stated
that, during her life, the first wife,
being the sole beneficiary, could have
made a valid assignment of the policy,
or could have disposed of her interest
in it by will. Though her interest
ceased at her death, the policy would
have been valid in the hands of her
assignee. Her death, therefore, did
not affect its validity; neither would
her divorce. Having died intestate,
her interest went to her husband
with all her other choses in action.
At common law all the wife's choses
in action, which were not reduced to
possession during their joint lives
passed to the husband uOn her death,
and this without regard to their
nature. By securing the assignment
of tile policy to hbi second wife, tile
husband reduced this chose in action
to possession. The assignment was
valid as against him and against the
world. It was said in hoehring v.
Mitccll, 1 Barb. Ch. 264 (affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, 4 How. Pr.
202), of a policy procured by the
wife upon her huz-band's life for her
benefit, that, after the death of both
of them, she having died first, the
benefits passed to his representatives.
The court also say in Olnsted v.
Keyes, that the common-law rights of
the husband were not affected, because when the policy was obtained,
there was a statute which made it
lawful for a wife to cause her hushand's life to be insured, and which
providtd that in case she survived
him, the amount of the insurance
should be payable to her, to and for

her own use, free from the claims of
his representatives or any, of his
creditors; and that, if she died I efore
lie did, it might be nmade payable
after her death to her children.
Neither were such rights affected by
a statute which prohibits a husband
from assigning a policy in favor of
his wife during her life.
In Kernan v. lloumd, 23 Wis. 108,
the husband paid the premiums on a
policy on his life in favor of his ,wife
or her legal representatives. She died
a few hours before he did, without
leaving children by this marriage;
the husband left two children by a
former wife. Prior to his knowledge
of the death of his wife, he made a
nuncupative will, directing that the
avails of the policy he divided letween his children and a stepchild, in
equal parts, "provided my wife does
not live." Hisright toso do wassustained.
A certificate in the nature of a
policy on the husband's life was payable to his wife or her legal representatives. She died first, and the instrument remained unchanged at his
death. It was ruled (one judge dissenting) that the benefit was intended
for the wife alone, and upon her death
resulted to her husband. "Legal
representatives," as used in the certificate, signified persons appointed
either by will or by law, to administer upon the estate of a person deceased: Washington B. 1E. Ass'n v.
Mood, 4 Mackay (D. C.), 19.
If the constitution of the organization which issued a certificate or policy
on the life of a member in favor of
his wife, provides thAt lie may hold,
dispose of, and fully control the
benefit to be derived therefrom, or
change the beneficiary, no rights
thereto pass to the representatives of
the wife, she dying before her husband, and both dying without issue:
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Richmond v. Johnson, 28 '\inn. 447;
Tafel v.Supreme Commandery, 12 Cin.
Law Bnl. 35 (in the Superior Court
of Cincinnati). In the case last cited,
the husband died without having
miade any other designation. Ii seems
that this was the fact in the other
case, but it is not quite clear from the
report of it. The Minnesota court
say: "With the right at all times to
hold, dispose of, and control, his mere
designation of some person to receive
the benefit would be revokable. It
would not prevent his subsequently
designating some other person to
receive it. While, in case of his
death without having revoked his
appointnent of his wife, she would
have been entitled to receive the
benefit, yet, during her life, because
of the power of revocation, all that
she had was a mere expectancy dependent on his will and pleasure.
That expectancy was not property,
not estate. The expectancy terminated when she died, and did not
pass to her administrator." The case
in the Superior Court of Cincinnati
is rested upon the same ground.
A certificate on the husband's life
in favor of his wife, was issued by a
society whose object was to accumulate a fund to be paid to the legal
representatives of a member at his
death. The husband survived his
wife, and died without making a
change in the certificate, though the
by-laws allowed a change to be made.
IIis legal representatives were held
to have a right superior to hers,
though it was admitted the case was
not free fromdoubt: Expressinen'sAid
S'ociety v. Lewis, 9 Mo. App. 412.
The court says that while this case is
not parallel to the case of a legacy, or
of a donation mortis eausa,there is an
analogy between them. It is not to
be presumed, because insured made
no change in his certificate, that he

de-ired the heirs of the b( neficiary to
receive the benetit if she died. Furtheri,,re, the nealing of the provision that the fund was to be paid to
the legal representatives of -, member,
is that, if at his deatl, there is no
appointee named by him. alive and
capable of taking, it is to go to his
next of kin.
A previous case in Missouri hd
decided that a husband, who survived
his wife and who had insured his life
for her benefit, the policy being payable to her or her legal representatives, could, after her death, with the
in.,urer s consent, make it piyable to
his second wife and others: Galnis v.
Covenant Mut. Life Ins. (b., 50 Mlo.
44. This policy was i-sned and the
wife died prior to the enactment of
the statute which authorized policies
on the liv:es of husbands, in the name
of and for the separate use of their
wives. The court say: "The only
ground upon which the policy could
be sustained when issued. is the fact
that the wife had a right to look to
the lu-band for support. It was
taken out for the lrpose of securing
her support after his death. The
premiums were pa!d hy him, and the
whole thing was instituted and carried
on for this laudable purpose. This
object being forever lo:t, was the
husband bound to continue the policy
for thebenefit of her representatives ?
Could he not surrender it, or, by failing to pay further premiums, let it
lapse? or could lie not, with the consent of the company, change the beneficiaries ? He must be held to have
had that right."
In Olstead v. lr.masonir Mutual
.Benefit Society, 37 Kan. 93, the husband was a member of said society.
Its professed object was to give aid to
the widows, orphans, and dependents
of deceased members. The certificate issued on the husband's life was
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payable to his wife or her legal representatives. She predeceased him
and left several children surviving.
lie died -without other heirs than
those in being when she died. Before
death he executed a will, in which he
undertook to bequeath the proceeds
of the certificate to his children, giving to one of them about one-half
thereof, and to the several others the
balance in unequal shares. No ciange
was made in the certificate, which remained in the member's possession
during his lifetime. It did not appear that there was any authority in
the rules of the society for changing
the beneficiary. A statute which
prescribesthe manner in which an insured person may designate a beneficiary, where the one appointed has
died, was not complied with. It was
ruled that the benefit was payable
according to the terms of the certificate. The prescribed mode of
making a change not having been
pursued, none was made. "Tie assured had no interest in the benefit
resulting from his membership. In
no event was it payable to him, nor
could it become a part of his estate;
and having no interest in the fund,
what was there for him to bequcata ?"
In Rider v. Ciarter Oak Life Ins.
Co., 27 '%iln. 193, a policy onl the
husband's life was payable at his
death to his wife E., if she survived
him; if not, to his children. The
consideration for the policy was all
paid during her lifetime. Ie and his
children survived her. On his remarriage, lie surrendered the policy
without; their consent and took a
paid-up one conditioned like the
original, except that it was for the
benefit of his then wife. It was ruled
that the children's rights could not
be thus taken from them. See Allis
v. Ware, 28 Id. 166.
In Conatinental Lije Ins. Cb. v. Haul-

ilton, 41 Ohio St. 274, a policy on the
husband's life was payable to his
wife, her executors, administrators, or
assigns, and if she died before her
husband, to their children. Before
the wife was entitled under the terms
of the policy to surrender it and obtain a paid-up policy, she died intestate, without children, leaving her
husband surviving. le paid the premiuis as they became due, and the
company dealt with him for a number of years as though lie was the
beneficiary. In a contest between
him and the wife's representatives it
was ruled that they could not claim
a paid-up policy" and that the insurer
was estopped from denying the husband's right to sue therefor.
In A ndersoe'sEstate, 85 Pa. St. 202,
the policy was on the husband's life
in favor of his wife, her executors,
adniii-trators, or assigns. She predeceased him, leaving one child, and
no will. The husband died intestate
and insolvent, without having made
any disposition of the policy. It was
ruled that the proceeds went to the
wife's estate. The same rule was
applied to a case where the certificate
was payable to the wife, her heirs or
assigns, she dying intestate without
having made an assignment: Midual
Aid Society v. Miller, 107 Id. 162.
In Lee v. Murrell, 7 Ky. Law Rep.
598 (Kentucky Superior Court), it
was ruled that a policy applied for
by the husband for the benefit of his
wife, while she was living, inured to
the use of her children although it
was not issued until after her death.
It is provided by statute in Kentucky
that a policy on the life of any person, expressed to be for the benefit of
any married woman, shall inure to
her separate use and that of her children. The case stated was ruled
tinder that act, as was Lee v. Page, 8
Id. 602, where the husband assigned
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a policy payable to his personal representatives or assignee to his wife.
The benefit of it passed, on her death,
to her children, and no part of it to
her husband.
In Si&nwis v. Biggs (Supreme
Court of N. C., February 27, 1888), a
wife in whose favor, and in favor of
whose children, policies on the liusband's life had been written, died intestate, he and her children surviving. In an action between their guardian and the husband's administrator,

it was ruled that the latter was entitled to the procteds of the policies.
This case followed Coaiglatnd v.Smith,
79 N. C. 303, where it was held that
insurance on a fatlfer's life for the
benefit of his children, one of whom
married and died without issue, so far
as her share was concerned, went to
her husband as administrator, on the
subsequent death of the insured.

J.R.

BERRYmAN,

Madison, Wis.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD CO. v. MARCHANT.
The word " injury" (or "injured") as used in 8, Art. xvi of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, means such legal wrong as would be the subject of an
action for damages at common law.
A "consequential" injuy is an injury to a man's property, the natural and
necessary result of the construction or enlargement of its works by a corporation; of such certain character that the damages therefor can be estimated
and paid or secured in advance, as provided in the Constitution.
A railroad company, constiucting and operating an elevated steam railroad
in a city, upon property owned by it in fee simple, and fronting on one side of
a street, is not liable, without negligence, under the Constitution of Pennsylvania, or otherwise, for the depreciation in the value of private property
fronting upon the opposite side of the street (no part of which was taken or
used in the erection or construction of the road), in consequence of the noise,
smoke, cinders, dirt and jarring necessarily resulting from the lawful operation
of the railroad.

ERROR to the Court of Common Pleas No. 3, of Philadelphia
County.
Wayne fac Veagh (George Tucker Bispham, A. I1. Vinter-

steen, and .ames A. Logan with him) for plaintiff in error.
-31 Hampton Todd (George H. Van Zandt with him) for de-

fendant in error.
PAxsoN, J.Apr*i 9, 1888.-This case is admittedly upon all
fours with Pennsylvania Railroad Company v. Lippinuott, 116

Penna. St. 472. If that decision is to stand, the present case
will have to be reversed, as they are in direct conflict. It is only
VoL. XXXVL-49
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just to the learned judge below, to sav that when this ase was
tried, the decision in Railroad Company v. Lijppincott had not
been decided; nor had it been argued here. Two of our number
dissented in that case, and two of those who heard the present
case did not hear the former. I was abroad at the time, and
our brother WILLIAMS was not a member of the court. In'view
of these ihcts and of the grave character of the question involved,
we have litecned to an elaborate argument involving the same
question, and have carefullv reconsidered it. It has not had the
efliet, however, of producing any change in the views of' the
nmjority of the court. Wi adhere to the ruling in .Railroad
()o ipaiiy v. Lil)pinicot, as announced by our brother GORDON.
The grounl was so fully covered by his opinion that this judgment might well be reversed, without a further discussion of the
principles involved. I concur fully in the views already expressed, and can hardly hope to throw additional light upon the
matter, or to strengthen the argument already made. In view
of the fict, however, that we listened to what was practically a
re-argument, I will add a few words by way of supplement to
the previous opinion of our brother GORDON , even at the risk of
some repetition.
The plaintiff below is the owner of property on the north
side of Filbert street, and brought his action to recover damages
for an alleged injury to said property, caused by the operation
of the defendants' elevated road.

The latter is constructed upon

land owned by the company, and the entire width of Filbert
street intervenes between the railroad and plaintiff's house. He
complains of the noise, tho dust, smoke and cinders, and the
eonstant jar caused by the passing trains. He says that these
causes combined interfere with the enjoyment of his property,
and lessens its market value. For the purposes of this cause we
must consider his allegations established by the verdict of the
jury.
The plaintiff claims to recover by virtue of the Constitution
of 1874, section 8 of article xvi of which, provides that
WM'unicipal and other corporations, and individuals invested
with the privilege of taking private property for public use,
shall make just compensation for property taken, injured or
destroyed, by the construction or enlargement of their works,
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highways or improvements, which compensation shall be paid
or secured before such taking, injury or destruction."
It was held in Railroad Comlany v. Eillincott, that the effect
of this clause of the Constitntion was to place corporations upon
the same plane with individuals as regards liability for injuries
to property; and that it only made a corporation liable where
aul individual was liable at common law. The correctness of
this ruling was conceded by the learned counsel for the plaintiff.
He says at page 13 of his printed brief: "We ask for no other
or greater liability to be imposed upon this railroad company
than would be imposed upon an individual in like circumstances." As, however, other counsel in other cases may not
concede so much, I will add a few words to this branch of the
case.
If we resort to the familiar rule of interpreting statutes, the old
law, the mischief and the remedy, we have no difficulty in
arriving at the true construction of the language cited from the
Constitution. Prior to 1874, the citizen whose property was
injured by a corporation in the construction of its works, had no
remedy therefor, unless some portion of his property was actually taken. This was an immunity enjoyed by corporations
and not by individuals. Cases of great hardship soon arose.
O'Conner v. The City of Pittsburg,18 Penna. St. 187, was one
of these. In that case, the city, by the change of the grade of
a street, practically ruined a valuable church property, yet there
was no remedy. This court of its own motion ordered a reargument of that ease, "in order to discover, if possible," in the
almost pathetic language of Chief Justice GIBSO,,, "some
way to relieve the plaintiff, consistently with law, but I grieve
to say we have discovered none." Instances of a like nature
might be cited indefinitely. I have selected this one as an illustration of the principle, and as, perhaps, one of the most striking.
In all of them, however, there was an injury to the property of
the plaintiff in consequence of tihe erection or construction of the
works oF the corporation, as by the change of grade in O'Conner
v. Pittsburg, and the interference with water rights, as in .31onongahda Navigation Company v. Coon, 6 W. & S. 101. In
all these cases, the property had been seriously injured, and yet
no portion of it taken by the offending corporation.
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This was the mischief which the Constitutional Convention
had bcfore it when section 8 of article xvi was adopted by
that body, and it was the evil the people were smarting under
when they ratified the work of the Convention at the polls.
Tile Constitution, since 1790, had declared that the property of
tile citizen should not be taken or applied to public use without
juast compensation. The Constitution of 1874 went further, and
declared not only that it shall not be taken, but also that it shall
not be injured or destroyed by corporations in the construction
or enlargement of their works, without making coin Iensation,
etc., etc. There is no ambiguity in this language. We have
applied it several times to cases arising under it without the
least difficulty. We are now asked to apply it, not to injuries
to the plaintiff's property arising from the construction of the
defendant's road, but to injuries resulting from the lawful operation of their road without negligence.
Before I proceed to discuss this banch of the case, in order
that we may know exactly where we stand, I will refer briefly
to the cases we have decided under this clause of the Constitution of 1874.
The City of .Readingv. Althouse, 93 Penna. St. 400, was a case
where certain springs or streams of water bad been diverted
from their usual course, to supply the city with water. By the
Act of April 14, 1853, applying to the Reading Water Company, it was provided, that where the corporation permanently
appropriated to its use such springs or streams as it might select
for water purposes, compensation should be made to the owners
for damages sustained. In an action against the city by a riparian owner, whose stream had been diverted, we held, not only
that the action could be sustained under the above Act of 1853,
but also that it could be maintained under section 8 of article
xvi of the Constitution. In referring to this section it was
said by Mr. Justice GORDON: "That section provides for the
making of compensation, not only for the taking of private
property for public use, as was the case theretofore, but also for
its injury or destruction. That the usewhich the plaintiff made
of the waters of the Great or Antietam Creek, through the race
or ditch in controversy, was property, though of an incorporeal
kind, is not open to debate, and that it was injured by the oper-
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ations of the City of Reading, is a fact established by the proper
tribunal. There is theretbre no good reason, apparent to us,
why the case should not be covered by the above recited eighth
section of the Constitution."
In the Borough of L\eei Brighton v. United Presbyterian
Church, 96 Peuna. St. 337, we had a case before us like O'Conner v. Piltsbw.q, and differing only in degree. The borough had
changed the grade of a street from two feet and a-half in some
places to fifteen feet in others, and we held that a property owner
injured thereby had a right to damages for said injury under the
Constitution of 1874, although no such right existed before.
Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Co. v. Patent, S. Ct.
Penna., February 15, 1836, was a case in which the said company, as the lessee of another railroad company, changed the
alignment of the tracks of said leased railroad in a certain street
in the borough of Manayunk, thereby obstructing the access to
a private house fronting thereon, and causing other consequential
injury thereto. In an action on the case against the company
to recover damages for such injuries, it was held that while the
plaintiff was entitled to recover upon other grounds, the case
came nevertheless within the Constitution of 1874.
In PennsylvaniaRailroad v. Duncan, 111 Penna. St. 352,
the plaintiff was allowed to recover in an action on the case for
damages to his property caused by the construction of defendant's road. The road was so near his property as to deprive
him of the use of Filbert street as a highway, and of four hundred feet of building front on said street. It is true Justice
GREEN and myself dissented in that case, but it was upon the
single ground that the company had paid $7,000,000 to the
State for its property and franchises ; had succeeded to all the
rights of the State, including the right to construct its road
without liability for consequential injuries, and we were unable
to see how the State could avoid its contract by amending its
Constitution. But we are all of opinion that but for this single
reason, the case came clearly within the Constitution of 1874.
County of Chester v. Brower, S. Ct. Penna., January 9, 1888,
decided at the present term, was a case where the county had
erected a bridge over French Creek in the borough of Phcenixville, and in the construction of the abutments or approaches to

386

PENNSYLVAVIA RAILROAD CO. v.MARCIIANT:

the bridge had built a wing wall nine feet six inches in height,
immediately in front of plaintiff's houses, and only seven feet
distant therefromi, thereby seriously interfering with his access
thereto, and his reasonable use and enjoyment of the same, we
held, affirming the court below, that the plaintiff was entitled
to recover dlamages for this injury, in an action on the case.
This was following directly in the line of the Railroad Company
v. Demican. It will he observed that they are all cases where
tie injury arose from the construction of the road. In no one
of them was there a claim for what are popularly called consequential damages, arising from the operation of the road after
its completion.
It will be noticed that all our cases decided prior to the Constitution of 1874, in which compensation was denied for what
we called consequential injuries, were instances in which the injuries were tihe result of the construction of the road, while all
our cases decided since 1874, and which came under the section
thereof referred to, likewise involved only injuries resulting
friom construction. The only exception is the case of Penna. .
R. Co. v. Lippincott, before referred to, and two or three other
cases, resting upon the same principle, and which were argued
and decided with it, and in each of which the right to recover
was denied.
The question whether under the Constitution of 1874, a corporation is responsible not only for property taken, injured, or
destroyed, in the construction or enlargement of its works, but
also for injuries or inconveniences, the result merely of the operation of its works, is a question of such supreme importance,
and of consequence so far reaching, that we approach it.- discussion with caution. If it is the mandate of the Constitution, it
must be obeyed. It is our duty to give effect to the will of the
people, lawfully expressed, and we shall perform it though it
stops every wheel in the commonwealth. But it is no part of
our duty to write into the Constitution something which the
people have not placed there.
Just here, it is proper to say, there is not a word about "consequential" injuries, in the Constitution. The word itself has
acquired a broad, popular meaning, by which many persons may
be misled.
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In judicial proceedings, it should be used intelligently, and
with due regard to its proper meaning. In its application to
the Constitution, we understand it to mean an injury to a man's
property, the natural and necessary result of the construction or
enlargement of its works by a corporation ; an injury of such
certain character that the damages therefor can be estimated,
and paid or secured in advance, as provided in the Constitution.
And attention is again called to the cases which I have cited,
and in which the constitutional provision has been invoked, and
in all of which there has been an actual, positive, visible injury,
the necessary result of the original construction.
In considering a new question, it is sometimes useful to carry
it out to its logical conclusion and see where it leads us to. It is
true the argu2nentum ab inconvenienti is entitled to but little
force in the fiee of a plain mandate of the Constitution. But it
is a persuasive argument in construing language which is capable of more than one interpretation, and especially it is so when
we are asked to amend the Constitution by a judicial decree.
If we hold that property owners on Filbert street are entitled
under the Constitution to recover for the injuries complained of
in this case; in other words, that it embraces iijuries the sole
result of the lawful operation of the defendants' road, where
are we to stop in its application? Where is the line to be
drawn ? If property owners on Filbert street may recover,
why not those on Arch street, and on Race, and so on north
and south, east and west, as far as the whistle of the locomotive
can be heard, and its smoke can be carried? The injury is the
same, it differs only in degree. And it does not stop here. The
Constitution does not apply to railroads merely. It affects all
corporations clothed with the power of eminentdomain, including cities, boroughs, counties and townships; it is applicable to
canals, turnpikes and other country roads. If by judicial construction we extend the Constitution to all the possibilities resulting from the lawful operation of a public work, to all kinds
of speculative and uncertain consequential injuries, we shall find
ourselves at sea, without chart or compass to guide us.
Were we to adopt such a construction, we would be compelled,
to use the language of Chief Justice SrrAW, in Proprietorsof
Locks and Canals v. Nashua & Lowell Railroad Company, 10
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Cushing, 385, to extend it "to turnpikes and canals, the value
of which is diminished or destroyed by loss of custom, to taverns and public houses deserted or left in obscurity ; to stage
coach proprietors and companies, to owners of dwelling-houses,
nmanufhctorics, wharves, and all other real estate in towns and
villages from which the line of travel has been diverted. if it
can extend to the next estate beyond the one crossed or touched
by the railroad, why not to the next, and the next, which may
be affected less in degree, but in the same manner?"
It is very plain to our view, that the constitutional provision
was only intended to apply to such injuries as are capable of
being ascertained at the time the works are being constructed
or enlarged, for the reason, among others, that it requires payment to be made therefor, or security to be given in advance.
This is only possible where the injury is the result of the construction or enlargement. For how can injuries which flow only
from the future operation of the road, and which may never
happen, be ascertained in advance, and compensation made
therefor?
It remains to say, that if the construction of the Constitution
contended for be correct, then we have a liability imposed upon
corporations in the operation of their works, which is not now,
and never has been, imposed upon individuals. No principle of
law is better settled than that a man has the right to the lawful
use and enjoyment of his own property, and that if in the
enjoyment of such right, without negligence or malice, an inconvenience or loss occurs to his neighbor, it is damnum absquc injuria.
This must be so, or every man would be at the mercy of his
neighbor, in the use and enjoyment of his own. In the late
case of the Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Sanderson, 113
Penna. St. 126, it was said by our brother CLARK: "Every
man has the right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own
property, and if, whilst lawfully in such use and enjoyment,
without negligence or malice on his part, an unavoidable loss
occurs to his neighbor, it is damnum absqie injuria,for the
rightful use of one's land may cause damage to another without
any legal wrong." No man is answerable in damages for the
reasonable exercise of a right, where it is accompanied by a cautious regard for the rights of others, where there is no just
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ground for the charge of negligence or unskillfulness, and when
the act is not done maliciously: Panon v. Holland, 17 Johns.
99. We need not consume time by the further citation of authorities fbr so plain a proposition. It is settled law. It was
not contended that the injuries of which plaintiff complains
are in any degree the result of the negligent or unskillful operation of defendants' road. On the contrary, they have expended
many millions to enable them to handle their business, and convey-their passengers and freight into the heart of the city, with
the least possible annoyance to persons and injury to property.
As was well observed by our brother GORDON, in the Railroad
Company v. Lippincoti, the company might have hauled their
enormous freight in carts or drays along Filbert street to its
present terminus, and no one would have had a legal cause of
complaint, though it is easy to see that the condition of property
owners on that street would have been far more intolerable in
such case than it is at present.
This brings us to the question, whether, in case a natural person
were the owner of this road, and were operating it in the manner
thattlie defendant company are now doing, he would be responsible
to the plaintiff in damages. We answer this question in the
negative. He would not be responsible, for the reason above
given, viz., that he would have a right to the reasonable use
and enjoyment of his property, and if, in such use, without negligence or malice, a loss unavoidably falls upon his neighbor, he
is not liable in damages therefor..
It is true this principle is qualified to a certain extent. A
man may not carry on a business which poisons theairand renders it unhealthy in a thickly populated neighborhood, and especially in the centre of a large city. For establishments which
involve danger, such as powder mills; injuries to health, such
as lead works, and manufactories of various kinds, which involve noise and disturbance to neighbors, a man must seek a
secluded place, where as few persons may be inconvenienced as
possible. These exceptions to the general rule are well established, and need not be further dwelt upon. But they have no
application to the case in hand. The necessities of a railroad
company and the character of its business compel it to seek the
heart of a great city. This is as much for the convenience of
VOL. XXXVL--50
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the public as for its own. Hence tile transportation of passengers and freight as near to the centre of a town as possible, is
in the direct line of its duty, whether that duty be performed by
a corporation or individual. It is a part of the lawful use and
enjoyment of property, and where it isdone without negligence,
entails no legal liability therefor. The proper use of such a
work as this is a matter of great public concern. That it may
also put money in the treasury of a corporation is aside from
the question. The fact remains that itis a great public benefit,
essential not only to the success of the business interests of the
city, but to other cities and other places as well. It is a metallic
nerve which thrills and vibrates from one end of this vast
country to the other. There are some inconveniences which, as
was decided in Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Sanderson, must
be endured by individuals for the general good. Otherwise we
would have an Utopia, where the whistle of the locomotive, the
hum of the spindle, and the ring of the hammer, are never
heard. It might be pleasant to dwell where there is nothing
to offend the eye, the ear, or any of the senses, but in this age
of rapid development in every branch of industry, it would be
difficult to find such a spot in the vicinity of our large cities.
We understand the word " injury" (or injured) as used in the
Constitution to mean such a legal wrong as would be the subject of an action for danages at common law. For such injuries, both corporations and individuals now stand upon the same
plane of responsibility.
That I am correct in the meaning we attach to the word "injured" appears abundantly by our own authorities. This was
clearly shown by our brother GORDON, in Railroad Company v.
Lippincott. In additian to the authorities there cited by him, I
will add Lehigh Bridge Company v. Lehigh Coal and Navigatlion
Company, 4 Rawle, 23; Pittsburg and Lake Erie Railroad
Company v. Jones, 1ll Penna. St. 204.
It is not necessary for us to look outside of our own State for
authorities in construing our own Constitution. It may not
be out of place, however, to say, that in England, where they
have statutes containing provisions bearing a close analogy to
our Constitution, and which give damages to persons whose
property though not taken, is yet "injuriously affected by the
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construction" of public works, such damages are not extended
to injuries resulting from the operation of the road.
It was said by Lord WESTBURY, in Ricket v. Railway Company, L. R. 2 Eng. & Irish Appeals, 203: "I agree with the
distinction that has been taken between damage resulting from
the railway when complete, or from the act of making it, and
damage occasioned by the proper (not negligent) user of the railway when made. No claim can be made for loss resulting from
the due user of a railway. * * * Compensation is given
by thestatute only to individuals who, in respect of the ownership or occupancy of lands or tenements, sustain loss in or
through the construction of the railway, or the erection of the
incidental works." To the same point are Hlammersmith & City
Railway Company v. Brand, L. R. 4 Eng. & Irish Appeals,
171 ; CaledonianRailway Company v. Mulcker, L. R. 7 Appeal
Cases, 2.59; Penny v. Southeastern.Railway Company, 7 E. & B.
660; Glasgow Union Railway Company v. Hunter, L. R. 2
Scotch & Div. Appeals, 78.
The language of the Constitution is not equivocal, and is
entirely free from ambiguity.
The framers of that instrument
understood the meaning of words, and many of them were
among the ablest lawyers in the State. Two of them occupy
seats upon this bench. Hence, when they extended the protection of the Constitution to persons whose property should be
injured or destroyed by corporations, in the construction or enlargement of their works, we must presume they meant just
what they said; that they intended to give a remedy merely for
legal wrongs, and not for such injuries as were damnum absque
injuria. Among the latter class of injuries are those which result from the use and enjoyment of a man's own property in a
lawful manner, without negligence and without malice. Such
injuries have never been actionable since the foundation of the
world.
Judgment reversed.
STERRErr, J., dissented.
Damagesfor land " taken, injured or
destroyed!"-The statutory provisions
upon the subjectof taking or injuring
thepropertyof privatepersons for the

benefit of the public are briefly as
follows:
The English Land Clauses Consolidation Act, 8 & 9 Viot. ch. 18,
63
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and 68, provides that compensation
shall be made for "injuriously affecting
such other lands by reason of the excrcise of the powers of this or the special
act," an I for " injurinnsly affecting"
lands by the "execution of the works."
The Constitutions of most, perhaps
all the States, in this country, secure
comnpensation for lands -'taken;" some
of thent for landi "taken or damaged;"
and the Constitution of Pennsylvania
provides (art. xvi, 3.8), that "'Municipal and other corporationi and individuals, invested with the privilege of
taking private property for public use,
shall imakejust compensation for property tlik-n, injured or destroyed by the
con'truction or enlargement of their
works, highways or improvements,
which compensation shall be paid or
secured before such taking, injury or
destruction."
In England, prior to 1867, damages
were allowed to be recovered, in proceedings under their acts, where the
railroaJ company had lowered the
road or street, and to had made the
access to plaintiff's property more inconvenient, and rendered additional
fences necessary : Reg. v. East. ly. Co.,
2 Q. B. 347; for the obstruction or a
private way: Glover v. N. ,Straffordshire
R!, Co., 16 Q. B. 912; of access to a
ferry: Reg. v. The Great.. By. Co., 14
Q. B. 25 ; for the depreciation in the
value of houses because the highway
was obstructed and access made inconvenient: (Jnamberlain v. IV. End, etc.,
By. Co., 2 B & S. 605; where by reason
of the obstruction of the highway,
fewer persons passed plaintiffs tailor
shop, and his trade was injured:
Senior v. Met. By. Co., 2 H. & C. 258;
for loss of trade: Caneron v. Charing
Cnmo By. Co.. 16 C. B. (N.S.) 430.
In 1867, the act came before the
Hotise of Lords for construction and
interpretation in the case of Ricket v.
Directors of the il!'et. fly. Co., 2 L. R.

(Eng. and Ir.App. Cases) 175. The
defendants had obstructed a footway,
alongside of which, plaintill's public
house was situated, and access to it was
made inconvenientand a loss ofeustom
followed. In the Court of Queen's
Bench the plaintiff recovered a verdict, tie fo ir judges being unanimously in his favor. Tile judgment
was reversed in the Exchequer Chainber by four out of the six judges; the
other two being in favor of affirming
the Queen's Bench. Upon appeal to
the House of Lords, three opinions
were delivered; two by Lord Chancellor
CItALOISFORD
and Lord
CR.ANwoRTir, affirming the judgment
of the Exchequer Chamber, and a
dissenting opinion by Lord WVu.sTnuity, in favor of the plaintiff's right
to recover. In commenting upon the
want of agreement among the judges
in their interpretation of the meaning
of the words "injuriously affected,"
Lord WFMATBURY says: "This case
was heard by six judges in the
Exchequer Chamber on a writ of
error from the Queen's Bench.
The six judges differed in opinion,
four being for reversing, and tw-o
for affirming, the judgment of the
court below. The four judges of the
Queen's Bench were unanimous. Deducting, therefore, the two from the
six judges in the Exchequer Chamber,
the unanimous judgment of the four
judges of the Q ieen's Bench las been
annulled by four judges in the Exchequer Chamber. By the same majorty, the case of Senior v. Met. Ry.
Co., decided by the Exchequer Chamher, an natmr,n v. Charig Cross -By.
Co., decided by the Common Pleas
(which are the authorities for the
judgment in the Court of Queen's
Bench in the present case), have also
been overruled. There are, therefore, the judicial opinions of ten or
twelve judges opposed to the present
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judgments, which are thejudicial opinions of four. It is a matter of regret
that our ju,licial institutions should
admit of that anomaly. * * * *
Moreover, it is distressing to be told
(as we are in the judgment before us)
that the Court of Exchequer Chamber
in Senior v. Met. .By. C. and the Court
of Common Pleas in Cameron v. Charing Cross By. Co. founded their judgments on the supposed effect of the
judgment given by the Exchequer
Chamber so recently as 1863, in
Chamberlain v. The London, etc., By.
0b., but that both the Common Pleas
and the Court of Exchequer did not
understand the judgment on which
they so relied. It is a striking example of the uncertainty of the law
which rests on j~idicial decisions"
It was decided that the plaintiff
could not recover. The Lord Chancellor held, that the damages sought
to be recovered were too remote, but
interpreted the act to mean that "unless the particular injury would have
been actionable before the comlany
had acquired their statutory powers,
it is not an injury for which compensationcan be claimed." Lord WESTBuRY took a broader view of the
words "injuriously affected." He
says, "When the railroad acts use
the term 'injuriously affected,' the
words do not mean 'wrongfully,' or
'unlawfully;' nor do they imply that
compensation is limited to cases where
the act done is such, as but for the
powers given, would be a tort at common law. The words mean 'damnously affected' only, and the consequential right to compensation is the
creation of the statute, to be ascertained and measured by the positive
language of the statute and not by analogy to actions of tort or trespass.
Plaintiff's interest in his house is
materially diminished by loss of custom. It is a fallacy to say 'the cus-

tom is one thing, and the house is
injury is to the cusanother; and ti.e
tom, and not to the house. You cannot separate the custom from tie
house." And this is tihe celebrated
authority upon which the courts in
this country rest in their restrictions
on the plaintiff's right to recover under provisions similar to those of the
English acts.
In this country, damages have been
recovered for obstructing access, light
and air; for injuring foundations by
tihe removal of earth; and for raising
or lowering the grade of the street:
11ot Springs .By. Co. v. Williamson, 45
Ark. R. 429 ; fReardon et al. v. City
and County of Stn Fianisco, 66 CaL
R. 492; City of Atlanta v. Green, 67
Ga. 386; . & TV. L .B.B/.Co. v.
511; Rigney v. ChicaAyres, 106 Ill.
go, 102Id. 64. InSt. L. V.&T. 1I.
208, it was
B. .. Co. v. Baller, 82 Ill.
held, that an action would lie where
property had been injured by depreciation in value from loss of business,
where a railroad company was required by a town ordinance to pay all
damages.
In Pennsylvania, prior to the Constitution of 1874, corporations invested with the power of taking private property for public use were liable for damages only where there had
been a taking. The Constitution extended this liability to cases of injury
or destruction. The first case that
presented this article of the Constitution for interpretation before the Supreme Court, was Penna. Rd. Co. v.
Duncan, 111 Penna. St. 352.
In 1880, the railroad had purchased the property of the owners on
the south side of Filbert street, in the
city of Philadelphia, from Broad
street to Twenty-first street, and built
an elevated railroad upon a substantial structure of masonry, passing over
the cross streets on arches; from
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Twenty-first street to tie river, a distance of four or five blocks, the tracks
were laid upon a structure of wooden
mid iron beams directly over the cartway of Filbert street, and sustained by
iron pillars. The property of Duncan was situated on north side of Filbert street. and extended fron Twentythird street to the river. The plaintiff
alleged that le had suffered damage
from the construction of a pier in the
river opposite F.Ibert street; from
the noise, burning cinders, smoke,
dust and dirt incident to the operation
and use of the road; by deprivation
of his use of Filbert street as a highway and of four hundred feet of building frout on said street; and by deprivation of free access to his wharves
cn the river front of his property.
Ie recovered. The court say nothing
as to any interpretation of the words,
"injured or destroyed," but devote
their whole opinion to a discussion of
the road's liability under the Constitution, the railroad having pleaded
that its rights to construct the road
were secured prior to the adoption of
the Constitution of 1874.
In the ease of The Philadelphiaand
Reading Rd. Co. v. Pate,, S. Ct.
Penna., February 15, 1886. the company had changed the alignment of
its tracks on the surface of a street
and thereby obstructed the access to
Patent's property, and he was allowed
to recover.
In The County of Chester v. Brower,
S. Ct. 'Penna., Jan. 9, 1888, a wall
nine feet high had been built immediately in front of Brower's house anl
only seven feet distant therefrom, to
make an approach to a bridge, and
for the interference to the access to
his property, Brower recovered.
In Pittsburgh,etc., MI. Co. v. .lcCutcheon, S. Ct. Penna, November 15,
1886, the access to defendant's property was obstructed by the building

of an elevated road over tile street,
directly in front of his property. Tile
Supreme Courtheld, that all damages,
direct or consequential, suflbred in
consequence of the building and operation of the road could be recovered.
In all of the eases heretofore cited
in Pennsylvania, arising under tile
Constitution of 1874,tlle railroad occupied part of tie highway upon
which tile properties abutted. An
opportunity to interpret the meaning
of the word "injured," where the
railroad did not occupy any part of
the highway, first presented itself before the Supreme Court in the ease of
Penna. ROd.C. v. Lippincott, 116 Penna.
St. 472, and three other similar eases
argued and decided at the saute time.
The properties of the plaintifl, in
three of the cases, residences, in the
other, a church, were situated on the
north side of Filbert street, in the
city of Philadelphia, and the railroad
was upon an elevated structure of
masonry, built upon property purchaser by the railroad company, situated on the south side of said street
and immediately opposite these properties. 'Filbert street is fifty-one feet
wide. Tie plaintiffs alleged a (epreciation in the value of their properties in consequence of tle nose, disturbance, smoke, sparks, and vapors
occasioned by the operation of defendant's railroad.
Evidence was
given to prove these allegations and
also the diminution in market and
rental value of the properties. These
eases were tried in Courts of Common
Pleas, Nos. 2 and 4, of Philadelphia
County, each court being composed
of three judges and were decided
unanimously in favor of the right of
the several plaintiffs to recover. A
precisely similar case, Penna. .. B.
Co. v. -11archant, here annotated,
was tried in Common Pleas No. 3, of
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same county, consisting of three
judges, and was unanimously decided
in plaintiff's favor. The Liplpincott
case, and its three unfortunate companions, were reversed in the Supreme
Court, consisting of seven judges, by
a majority of one; two judges being
absent and one dissenting The farchantcase, in which thi court allowed
a reargumnent, was also revers.,l, by a
majority of three, one judge being
ab-ent, and the same judges dissenting. So that, out of fifteen judges,
before whom the cases have been
argued, ten are in favor of the plaintiff's right to recover, and five are
against it; the only difference in the
judges being, that sume are of the
Court of "Common Pleas," and some
of the "Supreme Court." The remarks of Lord AV TsTBurty (sapra),
do not seem :o be inappropriate.
The Supreme Court in these cases
say, " We understand the word 'injury' (or injured), as used in the
Constitution, to mean such legal
wrong as would be the support of an
action for damages at common law"
What does the word "injured"
mean? Does it mean to inchde only
injuries for which corporations were
not compelled, before 1874, to pay
damages, or does it include, in addition to those, injuries which wereso
in fact but not in law? It cannot be
doubted that the legislature, or the
people, by constitutional enactment,
could compel those invested with the
right to take private property, to pay
any damages for any injury. A reference to the debates in the Constitutional Convention of 1873, will
clearly show, that the precise injury
which the plaintiffs in those cases
suffered, was one which some of the
members of thatbody thought ought
to be compensated in damages, and
the case in point cited as an illstration was Bd. Co. v. Speer, 56 Penna.

St. 325. That case was exactly like
the Lippincot tand Jru'rchhmt cases in
the kind of injury suflbred, but the
dift rence was in the location of the
road ; in the Speer case, it was situated on the eartway of a public street,
directly in front of 'pee 's residence.
In this case, no recovery cou.d be had
because the law then provided for
damages for property .kenounly. The
result of these recent decisions is that
the advance made in providing damages for injuries is so slight that some
of the most grievous injuries that can
be inflicted on citizens by those acting
under the right of eminent domain,
gi unredressed. With our Reports
full of cases in which redress for just
such injuries could not be obtained,
by reason of the inability of the law
to au.1rd it, can it be doubted that the
people intendd the word "injured"
to have a broader meaning than that
given it by tie Supreme Court? Of
course, the broader meaning would
include also the more restricted one
which has been adopted. There is
no advantage il restricting the liability of those acting under powers of
eminent domain to make compensation for injuriesonly, for which individuals would be liable at common
law, if they acted without clarter
authority. It is well known that the
former class do injuries, peculiar to
the construction and operation of
their work, which individuals acting
without their authority do not do.
The plaintiffs in these caes proved
the depreciation in time value of their
properties. The railroad company
admitted the injury, for their witnesses
also proved the depreciation in
market value, although they did not
admit so great a decrease in value as
was claimed. Why could they not
recover? The Supreme Court seem
to think that no recovery could be
had, unless it was proved that the
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railroad was a nuisance. That if the
road was operated negligently or unlawfully, there was a remedy at common law, but that the evidence did
not prove such a case, and that the
ordinary and proper operation of a
railroad upon the private property of
the comp.my, was not a nuisance.
Why the question of nuisance should
have arisen, or why it should be considered necessary to prove that the
company was guilty of a tort, it is
difficult to underbtand. The ,onbtitution simply lroviles a statutory
remedy for a statutory injury, and the
obligation to make compensatimn for
it, is as binding upon the company as
if written in theircharter; and there
is no nece-sity to call the injury a
In the Lippincott case,
nu:sa'ce.'
the only point actuaily decided by the
Supreme Coott, was that the trial
judge had given the jury an incorrect
measure of damages, nmnely, the
market value of the property before
and after the construction of the railroad, but the opinion goes somewhat
further and gives certain reasons why
there can be no recovery. " It is not
alleged," say the court, "that any injury has resulted from the erection of
this elevated roadway, .nor, indeed,
could it truthfully be so alleged, for
the erection is on the defendant's own
ground, on the south side of the said
street, which street is some fifty-one
feet wide, so that no part of the plaintiff's property or any right of way, or
other appurtenance thereunto belonging, has been taken or used in the
erection or construction of said viaduct. The damage complained of
results wholly from the manne: in
which the roadway is used." The
operation of the road is necessarily
involved in its construction. The injuries wlich are to be compensated
are those caued "itt the construetion." This dearly does not mean

the mere structure of masonry and
iron rails, but the building of all that
is necessary to make a railroad, a living, moving thing, or to use the Englibh expression, the construction of
the railroad as a" way-going concern.'
While, therefore, dirt, dust, smoke,
etc., may not be takin into consideration as distinct elements of damage,
they are to be considered as time necessarv results of the conztruction of the
railroad, "as a way-going concern."
If the court intend to be strictly literal in the meaning they give to
"construction," they should not have
alliwed a recovery in anly of the cases
which have arisen under this coustitut'onal provision, fori none of them
has the damage been occasioned by
the mere erection of the structure,
but always by the structure erected.
Time railroad company have just as
much right to maintain their structure
when once erected under lawful authority as they have to operate their
road when once built, and therefore
should not pay damages in one case
more than in tile
other; and no damages should be paid except those
which were done during the progress
of de construction. But from Duncan's case down, damages have been
allowed which were occasioned by
the standing of the structure. It is
clear that in many cases, no great
amount of damage would be done
except by the construction of the road
as a "way-going concern." And precisely tIme same thing is true of a
"taking:' Where a narrow strip of
a farm was "taken," a recovery could
be had, not only for the value of the
land actually taken, bzit also for the
depreciation in value of the whole
tract, and this depreciation was caused
in many cases, not by time mere "taking," but by the operation of the road
consequent upon such "taking."
Damage may be caused either by a
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"taking," an ' injury," or a "destruction," or all of them together. So
that, although no damage may result
from a" taking," because the property
upon which the road is bui't has been
purchased, clearly if loss results from
an " injury or destruction," within the
meaning of the Constitution, compensation is to be made. It, therefore,
makes little difference whether the
"injury" is caused by a structure
upon property parchasedor taken. If
a railroad company acquires the right
to lay or build its road upon or over
a street, it has just as much right to
operate its road on or over the street
as if it h.d bought the property upon
which the road is laid. The injury
would be just as great. Does the
court mean that if the same injury
as the plaintiffs suffered, had been
done by a railroad constructed upon
a street, there could have been a recovery? It it does not, the private
ownership of the property is of no
importance. If it does mean to hold
that recovery could be had in such
a case, then the ordinary operation of
a railroad must, in some cases, be a
nuisance.
The fact that tie plaintiffs property was separated from the private
property of the railroad company by
a public street, fifty-one feet wide,
seems an insuperable obstacle to a recovery. The court probably made
this remark under the theory that the
company was accused of maintaining
a nuisance, but it is difficult to see
how it can be held as matter of law
that a nuisance ceases to be a nuisance
because it is fifty-one feet away from
the person complaining of it. If the
injury complained of, is not an injury
in law at all, the distance of the
cause of it from the property injured
is of no importance. But granting
that the injury complained of in these
cases is a legal injury, does the fact
VOL. XXXVI.-51
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that its cause is fifty-one feet away
from the injured property enable the
court to say as matter 017law that in
those cases there is no injury? Is
there any magic in the word "street,"
or is it in the distance of fifty-one
feet, so that the same decision would
have been made, if the intervening
space had been private property? If
the street had been ten feet wide,
would there have been an injury ? But
if the distance of fifty-one feet enables
the court to say as matter of law
there is no injury, how near must the
property be to that of the company to
enable the court to say as matter of
law, that there is an injury, and refer
the assessment of damages merely to
thejury? Or does the injury continue a question of fact over the debatable ground from the company's
property up to the limit of fifty-one
feet, and then suddenly become a
question of law?
In the iMarchant case, where the
court allowed a reargument, the decision in the Lippincott case was reaffirmed, and additional reasons given
therefor. We are told, that "if we
resort to the familiar rule of interpreting statutes, the old law, the
mischief, and the remedy, we have no
difficulty in arriving at the true construction of the language cited from
the Constitution."
This is undoubtedly true; but the" mischief" should
be considered as it actually existed.
In defining "consequential" injuries,
the court says, "In its application
to the Constitution, we understand it
to mean an injury to a man's property,
the natural and necessary result of the
construction or enlargement of its
works by a corporation ; an injury of
such certain character that the
damage therefor can be estimated and
paid or secured in advance as provided
in the Constitution"
Why is not
the plaintiff's injumy just such an
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ijttry as this? A jury can just as
readily determine the depreciation
eall-ed bv liability to operation which
will pour dirt, dust, etc., into ote's
hou-e as will obstruct his right of way.
Such injury catl be paid for, because
that could be done by agreement only:
it can be secured, be.'ause the maximum amount of security would be the
value of the property.
" But," say the court, "if these
owners are entitled to recover, where
is the line to be drawn ?" Wvhy can
not owners, one, two or three blocks
away recover also? Tile answer is
that the court is not to "draw the
line" at all. If the injury of the
plaintiffs is not within the meaning
of the Constitution, tlat ends tile
matter; but if it is, then the line is
to be drawt by the jury, for it is a
question of fact whether a man's
right of way is obstructed, although
the railroad is built upon the street
in front of his property. It might be
that a dwelling-house one hundred

be determined what kind of a dainazm" the loss is, before it can be said
that it is "absque injuria." Yet, we
are told that " the language of the
Constitution is not equivocal and is
entirely free from ambiguity. The
framers of that instrument understood
the meaning of words, and many of
them were among the ablest lawyers in
the State. Two of them occupy seats
upon this bench. Hence, when they extenled the protection of the Constitution to persons whose propertvshould
be injured or destroyed by corporations in tile construction or enlargement of their works, we must presume
that they meant just what they said
that they intended to find a remedy
mere'y for legal wrongs and not for
such injuries as were dantman absque
injriat." We may all agree that the

language of the Constitution is not
"equivocal," and is "free from all
ambiguity," but the difference of
opinion among the many judges before whom this language and similar
expressions have conic for interpretafeet distant from the company's
tion, certainly shows that it is by no
property, received greater injury titan
atl Open lot, used as a stone-yard, only means beyond all doubt that the intwenty-live feet distant. The ques- terpretation of the Supreme Court is
the only correct one. These decisions
tion whether there is an injury, is
rest simply upon two a:sumnptions,
one for tile jury. The Couititution
that the meaning given to the word
which secures the existence of the
"injured" by the court is beyond -all
tSupreme Court provides also that
peradventure co rect; and that the
trial by jury shall remain as heretoplaintitIS' injury is damntuat absque
fore. It is still the tribunal to deinjuria.
property, of
cide
questions of
In a dissenting opinion in the 1Mireputation, and life, between natchant case, here annotated. Judge
ural persons; is it not able to settle
diffictilties where one of tIme parties SmttnF.mrr had argued in favor of the
right of the plaintiff, in this and
is an artificial person?
similar cases, to recover, lie shows,
Then, again, the plaintiffs cannot
recover because their loss is doatnum first, that the ob:igaion to make comabsqu,,e ijtLPria. TIe chief use of this pensation, itposed by the Constitumuch abused phrase would seem to tion, is, in effect, written into every
grant of power to take, injure or debe as a fortuila for theadministration
strov, private proverty for railroad
of legal consolation, in cases of" damnous" atliction, rather than as a reason for a legal decision. It must first

purposes. or any other public use.
&cond, that the history of legislative
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and constitutional enactments, and the
acknowledged wrongs which had, before the Constitution of 1874, been
unredressed, clearly indicate that the
provision i the present Constitution
was intended to aflbid a remedy for
just such injuries as the plaintiffi in
these cases have suffered.
The earliest constititional guaranty
which was reordained in the Constitution of 1838, provided for the making compensation for property taken
only, and afforded no remedy for
consequential damages. Cases of extreme hardship, where property was
injured but not tLken, soon arose, and
no redress was afforded by the law.
As where a corporation, under legal
authority, constructed dams in a river,
one of which caused back water in a
tributary stream and injured a mill.
The court decided that, as the mill
was not taken, nor was the owner
deprived of it, liewas not injured in
law: M1onongahela Nay. Co. v. Koons
(6 W. & S. 101).
Other cases of
great hardship came before the courts,
asking for redress which they found
themselves unable to give. In 0"Connor v. Pittsburgh(IS Penna. St. 189),
the grade of the street had been
lowered to such a degree, that plaintiff property (a church) was rendered
useless. In this case, Chief Justice
Giaso~q declared, "It is inequitable
to injure the property of an individual for the benefit of the many; to
attain complete justice, every damage
to private property ought to be compensated by the State or corporation
that occasions it." In Railroad Co. v.
Speer, supra, a railroad had been built
under legal authority, on a public
street in front of defendant's dwelling,
and it was held that he could not
recover for any injury resulting from
the legitimate operation of the road,
although he was deprived of the
proper employment of his house.
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This was the state of the law when
the Convention met to form the Constitution of 1874, and from the remarks of members of that assembly,
during tile
debate upon the present
enactment, it would seem that it was
the intention to give redress for just
such injuries as these and similar
cases illustrated. Referring to the
justice of requiring compensation for
injuries to land adjacent, no part of
which was taken, one member said,
"When a railroad runs through a mnans
property, close to his barn or house,
you take into view the disadvantages caused by the close proximity
of the road, the danger of fire, the
annoyance from sparks, we -But, if
the road was not to run through a
man's property. but near it, no matter
what injury to his property, he would
get nothing." The President of the
Convention, the late William M.
Meredith, said, ' There is no reason
why a man in the neighborhood of a
public work, injured by the construction of it, should not recover damages,
just as much if his property is not
taken, as if it is. If the corner of a
man's farm is taken, he comes for
damages. What is the injury done
to him by the taking of his property ?
It is tile value of the part of the
farm taken; but the value of the
whole has been injured; that is, his
property in the vicinity of the work
has been injured, and yet, if it so
happens that they go just an inch
outside of the corner of his farm, and
liemay be equally injured, lie cannot,
under this blind clause, as I may call
it, in our present Constitution, recover a dollar of damages. Let us
try and regulate that and restore it
to the reason and experience and protection of the common law, by providing that when these works are
made, the property injured by them,
whether taken or not, shall be entitled
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to recover damages; that is, if the
value of the property in the neighborhood is depreciated, its owners
shall recover the difference between
what the property would have sold
for, before the work, and what it would
sell for afterwards." (3 Debates, 597.)
Third: The learned judge points
out also that the court by its decision
in the present cases, has departed
from its fornier decisions in .Radroadv.
.Duncaul, J6il,'o ,d v. llceCutcheou, and
other casc- decided since the adoption
lie
of the Constitution of 1874.
says: "The crowning evil of the
construction, is in restricting the
words, 'injured or destroyed,' to such
injuries as result wholly from construction alone, and holding there
can be no recovery for injuries resulting from the use of the road for the
very purposes for which its construction was authorized by the legislature.
*
*
It may be asserted without
fear of contradiction, that, in principle. they (Dwea v. B. R. and JfcOutcheon v.1". R.) are both identical

with the present and other Filbert
street cases. HIow toines it then that
the judgment for dam ages to Duncan's
property on the same side of Filbert
street was affirmed, and the judgments
in favor of Lippincott and others, for
precisely the same kind of damages,
are reversed ? It is only because of a
radical and unwarranted departure
from the theretofore recognized and
correct construction of the section in
question, which, as we have seen, was
intended to protect private property
from virtual confiscation, to the extent that it is directly and necessarily
damaged for the public benefit and
the benefit of the locim tencns of the
State. This unjust and utnequitable
result was made possible only by ignoring, or rather reversing, the cardinal rules of construction applicable to remedial statutes, and more
particularly to constitutional provisions for the protection of person or
property."
W-m. H. BURNMT.
Philadelphia.

